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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20001056-CA 
v. : 
ANDREW WEISBERG, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction for stalking, a second degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1999 & Supp. 2001). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(2)(e) 
(1999 & Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is the evidence sufficient to establish that defendant used a dangerous weapon, 
where he moved a shot gun from the passenger compartment of his car to the trunk, in 
full view of anyone watching from inside the victim's business? 
To prevail on a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict, "'the one challenging the 
verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. 
1 
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 1j 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). This Court will not overturn a jury verdict unless the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, is "so insufficient that 
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.'" State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 
42,994P.2dl77. 
2. Was the jury correctly instructed that "exhibiting" a dangerous weapon "in 
such a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person " constitutes use of a 
dangerous weapon? 
"The propriety of the instructions given to the jury is a question of law [this 
Court] therefore review[s] the trial court's instructions for correctness." Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
3. Is the stalking statute constitutionally overbroad and vague as applied to 
defendant who repeatedly appeared in the parking lot outside the victim's business for 
no apparently legitimate purpose and threatened her physical safety, including 
exhibiting a shot gun? 
"When reviewing statutes for constitutionality, a statute is presumed 
constitutional, and '[the reviewing court] resolve[s] any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality/" Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Utah App. 1997) 
(quoting Society ofSeparationistst Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993)). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes ami IIIJRN .tit" contained in 
addendum D, inJnJiiu: ih<: lolloping: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1999 & Supp. 2001); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601(5) (1999 & Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant w as charged. a ith stalking, a second degree felon} (R 1) Follow ing a 
two-dav |ur\ in.il hrlii mi 25-26 October 2000, he was convicted as charged (R262:318). 
The trial court imposed the statutory term of one-to-fifteen years with credit for time 
served (R263:30). Defendant timely appealed (R253-54). 
S I ATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Defendant blamed victim Robin Archibald for an alleged investment loss of 
approximately $115,000. He retaliated by stalking Robin at her place of business and 
threatening that, among other things, he'd "like to hire some black men " jially rape 
her"(Sui I. 
Robin first became acquainted with defendant in April 1997 when he and another 
man conducted a real estate transaction with her company, Avis and Archibald i ^ 
Company (AATC) (R2'> I J'i1 "M" '• • * U" f i m i l l ' , bJn i l e i r n d u n i - . i i f t r •• 
l o s s an< i • si led \ i\ F'C, claiming that his loss was the result of Robin and AATC breaching 
^he facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
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their duty to him (id.). Robin and AATC denied any responsibility for defendant's 
financial loss (id.). The parties eventually reached a settlement (id.). 
"Robin, you better back off or 
you will find your cold, dead body in afield somewhere " 
On 11 August 1997, Robin received a fax from C&A Properties, a limited liability 
company of which defendant was the principal—the fax stated, "Liar, liar, pants on fire" 
(R261:36-37). Around this same time, Robin began to notice that defendant would pull 
into AATC's parking lot in his "big red" Dodge sport truck and slow down or stop, in 
order to stare into the glass-fronted office: ".. . I would just see him pull in, slow down, 
kind of staring into [AATC] and then go down and turn around and come back and stare 
in . . . he would be just looking and just very slow, slower even than normal traffic" 
(R261:26, 39). During this same period, Robin also received countless hang-up calls and 
one call from raspy-voiced person who threatened Robin that she'd "better back off or 
[she would] find [her] cold, dead body in a field somewhere" (R261:38). 
"It's like a horror film stare" 
On 14 October 1997, Robin was working alone and late at AATC when she heard 
"a banging . . . like a boom box or radio" coming from the parking lot (R261:40,44). 
Robin looked out the window into the darkened night and saw defendant sitting in his 
truck staring back at her (R261:43). None of the near-by businesses were open (id.). 
Robin called 911 and reported defendant's license plate number (id.). Defendant 
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remained in the parking lot staring at Robin with what she described as a "horror film 
stare" for approximately five-minutes before cli i v nig aw ay (R 261:43) 
A \ \ n parking lot "at least once a 
week, sometimes twice, sometimes every day, sometimes two or three times a day" 
(R261:48). On some of these occasions, defendant was patronizing near-by businesses 
(id.). On numerous other occasions, , :< • it 
would pull in and just sit in his car. Sometimes he would get out of his car 
and walk down the sidewalk and stare at me, walk back up the sidewalk 
and get in his car and leave. Sometimes he would go into the cleaners and 
leave the cleaners, nothing in his hands. Didn't take anything in and didn't 
take anything out. Sometimes he'd just drive through. 
(R261:49). 
"Bring it on detective, bring it on " 
On 30 March 1998, Officer Nelson of the South Ogden Police Department 
followed up on Robin's complaints about defendant's behavior: "[Robin] had indicated 
or reported • • defendant] was pinking in Iront ol Itn business MU\ w.ilfhirty liei .iml 
her employees . . . She also indicated that [defendant], she had observed [defendant] 
following her in her vehicle and she suspected [defendant] of sending a curious fax to 
her business" (R262:189-1W>, Officer Nelson spoke w till tlaaiciaiii over ilir lolephoiu' 
(R262:1 •-* ^fondant claimed that he was in the AATC parking lot conducting 
business and he also denied sending the fax (R262:191). Officer Nelson informed 
defendant that the police department "would continue monitoring his situation and [] put 
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[defendant] on notice that if [he] continued his pursuit of [Robin], that [the police] would 
pursue stalking charges" (R262:192). Defendant replied, "Bring it on detective, bring it 
on" (id.). 
"What in the hell did you do to make [defendant] so mad? " 
Approximately one week later, Robin encountered defendant at a local restaurant. 
On 6 April 1998, Robin and Casey, an AATC employee, went to lunch at Winger's 
restaurant in Ogden, Utah (R261:49-50, 105). Driving into the Winger's parking lot, 
Robin and Casey saw defendant sitting in his car in the southwest parking area 
(R261:52). Robin and Casey assumed that defendant was not planning to enter Winger's 
and parked in the northwest parking area and walked toward the entrance (id.). When 
Robin and Casey were "fifteen feet before the door, [defendant] rounded the south corner 
of Winger's" (R261:53). While looking at Robin, defendant "reached into his coat really 
slowly and acted as if he was going to pull something out" (R261:107). Thinking that 
defendant had a gun, Robin became extremely nervous (R261:53). Ultimately, defendant 
pulled a cell phone from his pocket (R261:53, 107). Seeking to avoid further contact 
with defendant, Robin immediately entered the restaurant (R261:54). Casey followed 
behind Robin and when she opened the restaurant door, defendant approached and 
"slammed the inside of the door with his hand . . . [causing] a loud bang" (R261:54, 
108). The waitress immediately seated Robin and Casey after noticing that both of them 
were visibly shaken (R261:54). Defendant walked past Robin and Casey and "mumbled 
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something about black" (R261:55). Defendant then abruptly sat down at a booth with 
Dennis Porter, a business acquaintance to both defendant and Robin (R261:55, 110). A 
few minutes later, defendant got up from the booth, walked by Robin and Casey, flipped 
them off, and walked out the door (R261:56, 110). After defendant left the restaurant, 
Porter approached Robin and asked, "what in the hell did you do to make [defendant] so 
mad?" (R261:57). Porter then related to Robin what defendant said (Supp. Record). 
Specifically, Porter reported that defendant had told the three men seated at 
Porter's table that he (defendant) recognized Robin's car and that "he believed he had 
bought it" (id.). Defendant also made several statements about what he would like to 
see happen to Robin, including: 
•"I'd like to hire some black men to brutally rape her... No, she fdprobably 
enjoy it"[;] 
• "If she were alone, Fd run over her with my truck and then I would back over 
her to make sure the job was done"[\] and 
• "[I] would like her severed head on a fucking platter" 
(id.). Upon hearing of defendant's threats, Robin "started bawling" (R261:111). 
"[Why do you] workf]for a bunch of liars and thieves? " 
Following the incident at the Winger's restaurant, defendant was in the AATC 
parking lot approximately twice a week (R261:113). On one of these occasions, 
defendant approached Casey in the parking lot and asked her why "she worked for a 
bunch of liars and thieves" (R261:58, 114-115). Because of defendant's actions, Robin 
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began keeping AATC's front door locked at all times and, at night, parked her car nght 
next to the front door (R261:119). 
On 22 June 1999, Robin was driving on Highway 89 when she turned to see 
defendant driving parallel with her (R261:59). Defendant drove next to Robin for a 
while, staring at her the whole time (R261:60). Robin, who was originally headed 
towards AATC, changed her route so that defendant would not know where she was 
headed (R261:61-62). For a while, defendant and Robin went separate routes as 
defendant took a different turn off from Highway 89 than did Robin (id.). Moments 
later, however, defendant met up with Robin (id.). Robin drove into an Albertson's 
parking lot because it was a well lit place (id.). 
"Robin [] [is] a lying bitch " 
Remaining inside her car, Robin called 911 from her cell phone (R262:171). 
Meanwhile, defendant went into Pack Mail, a nearby business (id.). Officer Bingham 
responded to Robin's 911 call (id.). Officer Bingham spoke briefly with Robin and 
noticed that defendant was in Pack Mail, staring at him and Robin through the window 
(id.). While Robin left the area and headed for AATC, Officer Bingham contacted 
defendant (id.). Defendant claimed that he was returning from Layton and had just 
dropped off an individual (R262:174). When Officer Bingham asked defendant why he 
had taken such a "round about way to get back to Pack Mail/' defendant "started to cuss 
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and swear and use profanity"; specifically, defendant called Robin, %4a lying bitch" 
(R262:174). 
Around August 1999, defendant's visits to the AATC parking lot accelerated 
(R261:125). Defendant would go into the dry cleaners next door to AATC "without 
anything and come back without anything" (R261:125). Other times, defendant would 
just drive through the AATC parking lot and just stare inside AATC (id.). 
On 25 August 1999, defendant signed a diversion agreement with South Ogden 
City that he would not initiate any further contact with Robin (R261:22-23). 
il[T]he employees had [] the door locked. They [were] obviously scared" 
On 20 December, South Ogden police responded to another complaint about 
defendant from AATC. Officer Shultz went to the business to speak with Robin 
(R262:193). Upon his arrival he observed that all of the employees were "obviously 
scared" and that he had to wait for them to unlock the front door (R262:194). While 
Officer Shultz was speaking with the employees, "defendant came up to the window and 
peered in" (id.). When Officer Shultz contacted defendant outside AATC, defendant 
"became kind of antagonistic, wanting to know what we [were] doing up there and what 
our business was and if it involved him" (R262:194-195). When Officer Nelson 
informed defendant that he needed to go, defendant "became real standoffish. He got [in 
the officer's] face a little bit He[] escalated the situation and just put his hands on his 
hips. He started to yell, to cause a scene and like was there to de-escalate the situation 
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and I just pretty much just told him to go" (R162:195). Defendant told the officer he was 
going to "grab his signs and picket" which he proceeded to do (R262:196). The officer 
allowed defendant to picket and did not "bother [defendant] or [] have "contact with him 
again while he was picketing" (id.). According to Officer Shultz, South Ogden police 
"always had another officer" accompany them whenever it was necessary to deal with 
[defendant], "just to stand by in case something did happen because of the 
unpredictability and just to keep everything at a professional level" (id.). 
"Oh my God, he's got a gun " 
Three days later, on 23 December 1999, defendant again drove into AATC's 
parking lot (R262:154-155). Defendant parked his white Acura behind Robin's car, with 
the trunk of his car facing AATC (R262:80). Defendant got out of his Acura and walked 
into the dry cleaners next door to AATC (R261:130-131). Defendant carried nothing 
with him as he entered and later exited the dry cleaners (id.). When defendant returned 
to his car he "flipped the trunk switch" from the driver's side door (R261:132). 
Defendant then walked around the passenger side, opened the door and took out a gun" 
(id.). One of Robin's employees screamed "Oh my God, he's got a gun. Robin he's got 
a gun, call the police, call them now, be careful" (R261:76). Defendant held "the handle 
[of the gun] in his right hand and the barrel in his left hand . . . the barrel [was] hanging 
down" (R261:133, 161). One of defendant's employees thought it looked like a sawed-
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off shot gun (R262:158). Defendant "looked toward Robin's office," before putting the 
gun in his trunk and driving away (R261:134, 159). 
Based on the "gun" incident, Officer Ruth obtained a warrant for defendant's 
arrest on a charge of stalking: 
While I was on the scene I knew that it had gotten too far where a gun had 
been produced. I needed some kind of assistance from the county 
attorney's office and again I had prepared all of these prior incidents and 
[was] aware of everything that was going on with [defendant] and Robin [] 
and her employees. So I contacted the county attorney's office by phone 
while on the scene with [AATC]. 
(R262:211). Defendant was arrested later that day while picketing AATC (R262:213). 
A pistol-grip shot gun was located in the trunk of defendant's car (id.) (see Exh. #1). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point L Defendant's alarming conduct in moving a shot gun from the passenger 
compartment of his car to the trunk in full view of anyone inside AATC, and while 
Robin's car was present, is sufficient to establish that he used a dangerous weapon to 
stalk Robin, particularly where this incident capped months of his stalking Robin at 
AATC and explicitly threatening her physical safety. 
Point II. The jury was correctly instructed that exhibiting a dangerous weapon 
"in such a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person" constitutes use of a 
dangerous weapon. The jury instruction is consistent with pertinent and controlling 
statutory definitions and case law. 
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Point III Defendant's First Amendment challenge to the stalking statute should 
be rejected for two reasons: First, defendant's inadequate analysis does not and cannot 
demonstrate that the stalking statute infringes constitutionally protected conduct; second, 
he does not and cannot demonstrate on this record that the stalking charge encompassed 
any constitutionally protected activity, i.e., defendant's picketing and legitimate 
patronage of businesses near AATC did not serve as the basis for the stalking charge or 
conviction here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
DEFENDANT USED A DANGEROUS WEAPON WHERE 
DEFENDANT MOVED A PISTOL-GRIP SHOT GUN FROM THE 
PASSENGER COMPARTMENT OF HIS CAR TO THE TRUNK, IN 
FULL VIEW OF ANYONE WATCHING FROM INSIDE AATC 
Stalking is a second degree felony "if the offenderf] use[s] a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601 [.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(6)(a) (1999). UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-l-601(5)(a)(ii) (1999), in turn provides that "'dangerous weapon' 
means[] any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury;... and[] the actor 
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an 
item." 
In Point I of his brief, defendant claims there is insufficient evidence that he used 
a dangerous weapon to stalk Robin; therefore, his conviction should be reduced to a class 
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A misdemeanor. Aplt. Br. at 13-17. The trial court rejected defendant's sufficiency 
challenge on the ground that his conduct, in moving a pistol-grip shot gun from the 
passenger compartment to the trunk of his car in full view of anyone watching from 
inside AATC clearly fell within the purview of the stalking statute and justified the 
enhanced second degree felony charge. This Court should do likewise. 
Proceedings below. After the State rested, and outside the presence of the jury, 
defendant moved to reduce the second degree felony stalking charge to a class A 
misdemeanor (R262:235). Defendant claimed that his conduct in moving the shotgun 
from the passenger compartment to the trunk of his car within view of Robin's 
employees did not amount to use of a weapon for purposes of stalking (R262:236). 
Defendant further complained that he did not "engage in a course of conduct directed at a 
specific person" because only Robin's employees saw him exhibit his shotgun 
(R262:237). Finally, defendant claimed that his one-time exhibition of the shotgun was 
insufficient: "course of conduct is defined as repeatedly which means you would have to 
have the weapon used more than once and in this case, we have a weapon used one time" 
(R262:238). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to reduce the stalking charge to a 
misdemeanor: 
I'm going to deny that motion as well for the following reasons; this 
particular crime is characterized as being a constellation of events, by its 
very definition that it's a course of conduct. I think for me to interpret the 
statute to require that a weapon be used at two or more times in order for it 
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to rise to the level of a second degree felony would be outside the common 
sense nature of the crime itself because it's a constellation of conduct and I 
think it's not just one thing, it's many things and that's exactly what it's 
described as in order for it to be, in fact, a stalking violation. 
As far as the victim never seeing the gun, I recognize that this case 
distinguishes itself from the case the State is relying on [In re R.G.B., 597 
P.2d 1333 (Utah 1979)], in that this was a direct contact with the victim. 
The gun was, although not pointed, shot, brandished in any way, it was in 
this person's front pants with the handle exposed therefore making it clear 
that it was available for use. 
This is one step removed in the sense that it deals with the situation 
or that she's not directly in view of it, but it's not an unreasonable step to 
also assume that since it was her place of business where she ordinarily 
was, her car was in the parking lot, that she was there and would find out 
about it because there were employees that obviously saw it and we can 
assume [defendant] may have known that. At least it's certainly subject to 
argument. 
Course of conduct implies threats implied by conduct and that's 
included under the course of conduct definition. It doesn't specifically say 
the person has to be in direct line with the weapon. It doesn't have to say 
they have to view it. This is a different kind of a case, right, and I think I 
hinge mainly on arguments of counsel frankly, unlike a lot of cases where 
it's just simply a matter of determining what actually happened. It's clear 
what happened here, the question is intentional knowing, those types of 
things. I'm going to deny the motion. 
And I'm specifically going to put this on the record because in case 
there is a review of this, I'm specifically relying on the guidance from the 
Utah Supreme Court in making my decision in the case of [R.G.B.] where it 
was the only case that I'm aware of where it specifically addressed the 
issue of use of a firearm. 
Frankly, I've seen it referred to actual use of a firearm, use of a 
firearm and frankly it's not real, there's no definition in the statute of what 
use of firearm is, but this case I think makes clear in the statement, if 
merely exhibiting the gun creates fear in the victim, it constitutes use of a 
firearm for that purpose. I'm relying on that statement in making my 
14 
decision. I just want them to know that so they can give me credit at least 
for relying on [precedent]. That's what I'm relying on in terms of allowing 
it to go forward. 
Obviously, the facts are fairly clear. The gun was not pointed. 
That's undisputed. The gun was not pointed. It was not used in any 
fashion other than exposed for a period of time, not in what could be, I 
guess, argued as a threatening manner, but was exposed just as having a 
gun in your belt probably could be argued as not a threatening manner 
similar to this case, it was found to have been in use. That's the best I can 
do. 
(R262:241-243) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained in addendum A). 
A. Defendant Has Not Marshaled Evidence That He Used A Dangerous 
Weapon to Stalk Robin. 
As a general rule, a defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper 
motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^ f 
14-17, 10 P.3d 346. Here, as set forth above, defendant preserved his sufficiency 
challenge; however, his allegations fail to establish insufficiency.2 
While defendant admits that he moved a "dangerous weapon" or "firearm" from 
the passenger compartment of his car to the trunk in full view of AATC employees, see 
Aplt. Br. at 14-15, he omits additional evidence that he parked directly behind Robin's 
car in the parking lot, with his trunk in full view of AATC, and that he "looked toward 
Robin's office," before putting the gun in his trunk and driving away" (R261.134, 159). 
2While defendant raised his sufficiency claim below, he did not do so in the 
context of a motion to arrest judgment (R262:235). Defendant's motion to arrest 
judgement focused solely on his constitutional challenge to the stalking statute {see 
R323-236), which claim is addressed in Point III of the State's brief. 
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He also omits evidence that this was not a small or concealed gun, but rather, that he held 
"the handle [of the gun] in his right hand and the barrel in his left hand . . . the barrel 
[was] hanging down," and that one of Robin's employees thought it looked like a sawed-
off shot gun (R261:133, 161) (R262:158). Finally, defendant fails to acknowledge this 
incident capped months of his stalking Robin and explicitly threatening her physical 
safety {see, e.g., Supp. Record) (a copy of the supplemental record is contained in 
addendum B). 
Accordingly, defendant's sufficiency challenge falls short of his burden to 
marshal the evidence that he used a dangerous weapon. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 
44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.2d 1108 (explaining same marshaling requirement for challenging trial 
court's findings); Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). Indeed, 
marshaling requires the defendant to gather all the evidence that supports the verdict and 
then explain how that evidence is not enough to sustain the conviction. See Gamblin, at 
f 17 n.2. "Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co. ,818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991). After gathering "this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. Defendant's failure to 
marshal the supporting evidence that he used a dangerous weapon is alone grounds to 
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reject his insufficiency claim. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,1f 16, 989 P.2d 1065; 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that failure to marshal "is 
grounds alone to reject" a sufficiency challenge). 
B. Evidence That Defendant Brandished a Pistol-grip Shot Gun in Full 
View of AATC Employees is Sufficient to Support his Second Degree 
Felony Stalking Conviction. 
In any event, defendant's sufficiency challenge is entirely premised on his self-
serving interpretation of the stalking statute. Rather than look to the pertinent statutory 
explanation of what it means to use a dangerous weapon in section 76-1-601, as directed 
by the stalking statute, defendant looks to non-controlling or irrelevant authority and 
claims that his conduct in moving the pistol-grip shot gun from "one location in his 
vehicle to another location" did not amount to using a dangerous weapon. Aplt. Br. at 
14-15 (citing e.g., People v. Chambers, 498 P.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Ca. 1972)). 
Section 76-1 -601 (5)(a)(ii), however, provides that "'dangerous weapon' means[] 
any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury;... and[] the actor represents 
to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item." Here, 
defendant's alarming conduct in inexplicably moving the pistol-grip shot gun from the 
passenger compartment to the trunk in full view of anyone inside AATC reasonably 
represented to those watching that defendant "[was] in control of [the shot gun]." Id. 
See also In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1979) (affirming aggravated robbery 
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conviction on evidence that "merely exhibiting the gun create[d] fear in the victim," and 
thus constituted "'use of a firearm' for that purpose"). 
Even under defendant's authorities, however, his conduct amounts to using a 
dangerous weapon. Aplt. Br. at 15 (citing e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 
(1995)). The issue in Bailey was the sufficiency of evidence that Bailey used a firearm in 
connection with drug trafficking. In the course of a traffic stop, police uncovered 
narcotics, and a large amount of cash and a loaded 9-mm. pistol in Bailey's trunk. Id. at 
139. The pertinent federal statute required evidence of use a firearm, which the Supreme 
Court determined to mean "active employment" of a firearm. Id. at 148. Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court declined to extend the definition of use or active employment of a 
firearm to encompass Bailey's situation: "If the gun is not disclosed or mentioned by the 
offender, it is not actively employed, and it is not 'used.'" Id. at 149. 
While, "the inert presence of a firearm, without more," is insufficient, under 
Bailey, defendant ignores the Supreme Court's further recognition that "active 
employment" or use "certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, 
and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm." Id. at 149. Indeed, Bailey 
emphasizes that "even an offender's reference to a firearm in his possession could 
satisfy" the federal statute: "Thus, a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a 
change in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a 'use,' just as the silent but 
obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a 'use.'" 
18 
In sharp contrast to Bailey's situation (caught trafficking with a pistol stowed in 
the trunk of his car), defendant actively displayed his pistol-grip shot gun in full view of 
AATC employees {see. e.g., R261:76, 133-134, 158-159, 161, 211). Defendant's 
brandishing constitutes "use" under both section 76-601-1 and Bailey, precisely because 
the brandishing was calculated to further alarm and frighten Robin and her employees 
(id.). Defendant's sufficiency challenge should be rejected. 
POINT II 
THE JURY WAS CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THAT 
"EXHIBITING" A DANGEROUS WEAPON "IN SUCH A 
MANNER THAT IT CREATES FEAR IN A REASONABLE 
PERSON" CONSTITUTES USE OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
Jury Instruction 34 provides as follows: 
Use of a dangerous weapon is defined as bringing or putting it into service 
or action or to put it to some purpose. If you find that a firearm is a 
dangerous weapon in this case, then its use may include, but is not limited 
to the following: pointing it at a person, shooting it, or exhibiting it in such 
a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person. 
(R163). 
In Point II of his brief, defendant complains that this instruction is incorrect, based 
on his strained construction of Bailey in Point I of his brief. Aplt. Br. at 18. For reasons 
set forth in Point I, supra, the State submits that defendant's reliance on Bailey is 
misplaced. Indeed, section 76-1-601(5) (defining use of a dangerous weapon as 
including a representation that the defendant is in control of the dangerous weapon) and 
R.G.B., 597 P.2d at 1335 (recognizing that mere exhibition of a weapon during a robbery 
is sufficient to convict for aggravated robbery), control this issue. Consistent with 
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section 76-1 -601 (5) and R.G.B., jury instruction 34 properly mstruc: hat "exhibiting" a 
dangerous weapon "in such a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person" 
constitutes use of a dangerous weapon (R163). Finally, as further set forth supra, the 
Bailey definition, properly construed, is consistent with both section 76-1-601(5) and 
R.G.B. because Bailey's definition of use of a weapon encompasses "brandishing" and 
"displaying." Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148. Thus, defendant's meritless challenge to jury 
instruction 34 fails even under his own faulty analysis. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY CONVICTED FOR 
STALKING AFTER HE REPEATEDLY APPEARED IN THE 
PUBLIC PARKING LOT OUTSIDE ROBIN'S BUSINESS FOR NO 
APPARENTLY LEGITIMATE PURPOSE AND THREATENED 
HER PHYSICAL SAFETY, INCLUDING EXHIBITING A PISTOL-
GRIP SHOT GUN 
In Point III of his brief, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the stalking 
statute, claiming that it is both vague and overbroad. Aplt Br. at 19-28. Defendant's 
constitutional challenge hinges on his assertion that the stalking statute infringes his First 
Amendment rights to free expression, or to picket, and to patronize other local 
businesses. Aplt. Br. at 24-28. Defendant's claim should be rejected for two reasons: 
First, defendant's inadequate analysis does not and cannot demonstrate that the stalking 
statute facially infringes constitutionally protected conduct; second, he does not and 
cannot demonstrate that as applied to him, the stalking statute encompassed any 
constitutionally protected activity, i.e., defendant's picketing and legitimate patronage of 
nearby businesses did not serve as the basis for the stalking charge and conviction here. 
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Proceedings Below, At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved to 
dismiss the stalking charge alleging that the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad (R262:218-235). The crux of defendant's oral argument was that while 
Robin had obtained protective orders against him two years earlier, they had been 
dismissed with prejudice in 1998 (R262:222, 225-227). Also, a diversion agreement he 
entered with South Ogden City (see R241-242), only prevented him from initiating 
contact with Robin and did not expressly require him to stay away from the AATC 
parking lot (R262:227-228). Defendant thus concluded that as a result of the dismissed 
protective orders and the diversion agreement, his conduct was "allowed in essence," and 
that the stalking statute was accordingly overbroad and vague as applied to him: "[H]e 
can't conform or doesn't know exactly what he needs to do to conform his conduct[.]" 
(R262:228-229). 
The trial court pointed out that the stalking statute required a knowing and 
intentional mental state which appeared to defeat defendant's claims of vagueness and 
overbreadth: 
Isn't that a defense to this? Simply a defense that based upon the, you 
know, the earlier proceedings and all that, or just based upon the argument 
generally, that you know, people have the right to come and go as they 
please, pretty much in this society and, you know, and it goes to his intent 
whether he even knew he was [d]oing something wrong. Doesn't it go to a 
question of fact more than anything though in this case? 
(R262:229-230). Defendant acknowledged that the stalking statute had previously been 
declared constitutional in Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997), and 
attempted to distinguish Lopez by asserting that 
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he's been given indications from judges which are the ultimate authorities 
as to what he can and cannot do, so to speak, and he relies upon those and 
now the county attorney files criminal charges against him for doing 
exactly what he was not prohibited form doing in both that order and in the 
diversion agreement. 
(R262:230). 
At the trial court's request the prosecutor explained her contrary understanding as 
to why the civil protective orders were dismissed: 
I review all of those documents and I was aware that they were filed. They 
were filed by [Robin's attorney] and my understanding was, not to 
disparage him, but that he hadn't quite done his job . . . . He represented 
[Robin] as she sought those civil protective orders. I mean he spelled 
[defendant's] name wrong on all of the complaints and frankly they were 
difficult to find because—looking them in that matter. I don't know the 
basis for the attorney's fees (inaudible) as they were ordered 
(R262:231). At the prosecutor's request, Robin further explained that she paid her 
attorney $1,000 "to help me and he called me up after. He said, I did this all wrong. 
They threw it out for stupid reasons and I'm going to pay the 900 or 800 bucks and I'm 
sorry. And I said you know what a thousand bucks was nothing, I just wanted the 
protections, so your apology doesn't help. That's basically what I said" (R262:231-232). 
The prosecutor continued that although the civil protective orders were 
unsuccessful, Robin "continued to contact the police and sought other avenues"of help: 
To say that [defendant] was not on notice that there was a stalking statute 
or that his behavior was unwanted or that he may (inaudible) prosecution 
for that is obviously not true. 
Now Judge Lyon may have dismissed two civil protection orders, 
but I doubt that Judge Lyon patted [defendant] on the back on his way out 
the door and said you keep doing what you're doing. You go hang out in 
that parking lot and, you know, if it bugs her, life's hard, she'll get over it. 
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I doubt Judge Lyon said that. I bet he dismissed it based on the stipulation 
and that was it. 
For [defendant] to walk out of there assuming that this conduct then 
became legitimate and welcomed and was not going to be the subject of 
further litigation or further criminal proceedings was obviously, if he left 
that day with that understanding, every time South Ogden approached him 
or every time the police contacted him, he should have been on notice that 
maybe it wasn't welcome, maybe it was unwanted and maybe he was going 
to be in trouble because of it. They distinctly told him to stay away from 
her. The diversion agreement was part of it and he was represented by 
[counsel]. Jeff Nelson specifically testified today that a week before the 
Winger's incident, he told [defendant] if he pursued that course of conduct 
he might be charged with stalking. That right there is notice enough. The 
statute is in the book and we assume that people know what the statutes are 
(R262:232-233). 
Defense counsel reiterated that the dismissal of the protective orders with 
prejudice ought be viewed in a light favorable to defendant's position (R262:233). 
The trial court observed that even if defendant's characterization of the dismissed 
protective orders was plausible, it did not mean that defendant's subsequent conduct was 
justified (R262:233-234). Defense counsel acknowledged that it "was a very fine line," 
but that defendant's behavior was not that of the stereotypical stalker "that's standing 
outside the bedroom window of somebody at night"(R262:234). He also reiterated his 
argument that "a couple of courts . . . say you (defendant) can continue on . . . " 
(R262:234). 
The trial court disputed defense counsel's characterization of the other courts and 
denied the motion: 
I'm going to deny your motion on the constitutionality issue. I think 
the statute does set forth specific and actually very clear conduct that is 
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required. It also sets forth a [mens red] that is intentional or knowingly and 
it also puts it in the standard of what a reasonable person would perceived 
and I think all those are facts specific to any given case. 
I would agree with you. I think this is a somewhat unusual case and 
its certainly subject to a great deal of advocacy, I think, and argument to the 
jury and a certainly has a lot of factual issues, I think, that need to be 
resolved by the jury and I think we can instruct clearly to the point where 
on the statute you have many arguments that you can make. 
(R262:235) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained in addendum C). 
Defendant raised his constitutional challenge to the stalking statute again in a 
post-trial motion for arrest of judgment (R230-236) (R263:1-3). The State filed an 
opposing memorandum, pointing out that the State did not rely on defendant's picketing 
at AATC as the basis for the stalking charge (R249). In oral argument, the State 
reminded the Court that just three days after one of the protective orders was dismissed 
defendant made threatening statements at Winger's restaurant (R263:5) {See Supp. 
Record). Moreover, police repeatedly told defendant to stop stalking Robin or he would 
be charged (R.263:5). 
The trial court reaffirmed its prior ruling and denied the motion: ".. . I don't see 
that this deviates in any significant way to cause me to review that statute and basically 
overturn the Court of Appeals on it. It's denied" (R263:6), add. C. 
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A. Defendant's Inadequate Argument Identifies No Offending Word or 
Phrase in the Stalking Statute; Nor Does it Demonstrate That the 
Instant Stalking Charge Encompasses Any Constitutionally Protected 
Conduct 
Defendant's constitutional challenge to the stalking statute is inadequately briefed. 
While defendant's 10-page argument recites the stalking statute and his case authority 
cites the pertinent legal framework, defendant wholly fails to identify any word or phrase 
in the stalking statute which renders it overbroad and vague. See Aplt. Br. at 20-28. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate procedure, provides that the argument portion of 
an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presentedf.]) (emphasis added). In lieu of meaningful analysis of the 
statutory language defendant substitutes bald conclusion, broadly alleging that the 
stalking statute "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden." Aplt. Br. at 23-27. 
Additionally, defendant blatantly asserts that his stalking conviction is based on 
his picketing AATC and patronizing nearby businesses. Aplt. Br. at 24-27. Defendant 
does not ground this claim with citation to the record, as further required by rule 24(a)(9) 
(appellant to include citations to the "parts of the record relied on"). Nor could he. As 
demonstrated above, the evidence and the prosecutor's statements to the trial court make 
plain that both Robin and law enforcement tolerated defendant's picketing and that 
defendant's picketing and patronage of nearby businesses did not serve as the basis for 
the instant stalking charge and conviction {see, e.g., (R249), (R261:36-38, 43, 48-62, 76, 
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130-133, 125),(R262:80, 154-155, 158-159, 174, 196), (R263:5), (Supp. Record)). 
Rather, as set forth in the Statement of the Facts, supra, defendant's stalking conviction 
rests on abundant evidence of his inappropriate and threatening conduct, including the 
numerous times he was present in the AATC parking lot for no apparent legitimate 
purpose, his threatening behavior at the Winger's restaurant, his following Robin on 
Highway 89, and finally, his alarming behavior the day of his arrest when he displayed a 
pistol-grip shot gun in the AATC parking lot in a "manner" to suggest "that he [was] in 
control" of the weapon (id.). See section 76-1-601. 
Defendant's twin failures to provide meaningful analysis of his constitutional 
claims and to ground his claim in the existing record are sufficient reasons in themselves 
to reject his constitutional challenges to the stalking statute. See State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) 
(declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal 
analysis and authority to support his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 
(UtahApp. 1998) (same). 
B. Salt Lake City v. Lopez Rejected Similar Overbreadth and Vagueness 
Challenges to the Stalking Statute and is Dispositive Here. 
Even overlooking defendant's inadequate briefing, Lopez is dispositive of 
defendant claims that the stalking statute is overbroad and vague as applied to him. Aplt. 
Br. at 27. Defendant's conclusory attempt to distinguish Lopez, where this Court 
rejected similar vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the stalking statute, is 
unavailing. 
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Lopez was told by his juvenile victim, her parents, and the juvenile victim's 
attorney, that his romantic interest was unwanted and should cease. Lopez, 935 P.2d at 
1261. When Lopez persisted, the juvenile victim obtained a no-contact order. Id. 
Despite these efforts, Lopez continued to contact her in public settings and was 
ultimately charged and convicted for stalking. Id. On appeal, Lopez challenged the 
constitutionality of the stalking statute, claiming that it "infring[ed] on his constitutional 
freedoms of association and movement... and fail[ed] to define 'emotional distress'[.]" 
Lopez, 935?.2d aX\262. 
Overbreadth. Before analyzing Lopez's challenge, the Court observed that "[A] 
statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad unless it renders unlawful a substantial amount 
of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 1262 (citing Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 
1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1990). Moreover, if conduct "and not merely speech is 
involved," "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, 
judged in relation to the statute's plain legitimate sweep." Id. (citing Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). 
The Court then proceeded to reject Lopez's claim of facial overbreadth, pointing 
out that Utah's stalking statute required a "course of conduct" "directed at causing 
another person emotional distress." Id. at 1263 (citations omitted). Therefore, the 
stalking statute did not encompass "[l]imited contact during legitimate innocent 
encounters . . . without conduct directed at causing physical harm or emotional distress to 
an intended person[.]" Id. at 1263-1264. The Court emphasized that the emotional 
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distress element of stalking "is not satisfied by causing mere anxiety or annoyance." Id. 
at 1264. Rather, looking to the well established tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, this Court applied the civil definition: "Emotional distress results from conduct 
that is 'outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality." Id. (citing Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 
905 (Utah 1992)). Thus, innocent conduct, such as picking up a child for visitation 
purposes or attending a child's performance "do not rise to the level of outrageous and 
intolerable conduct that would reasonably cause 'emotional distress.'" Id. at 1263-1264. 
Rather, the stalking statute "is narrowly drafted to restrict only threatening 
behavior, with limited infringement on rights to free association and movement." Id. at 
1264. This means that 
conduct is not criminal unless it is repeated (specifically defined as two or 
more occasions), and the defendant 'intentionally or knowingly engages in 
a course of conduct' that is 'directed at a specific person' such that a 
'reasonable person' would suffer emotional distress, and the defendant 
knows or should know that the specific person will suffer emotional 
distress. 
Id. (quoting section 76-5-106.5(2)). The Court concluded that "[t]he restrictions this 
statute may impose on a person's ability to move about and associate freely are limited 
and justified by the state's compelling interest in protecting its citizens from threatening 
or harmful behavior." Id. In so concluding, the Court further noted that "[t]he facial 
overbreadth doctrine is [] limited" and "attenuates further as the prohibited behavior 
moves from pure speech towards conduct that, even if expressive, may be properly 
restricted as a legitimate state interest." Id. 
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The Court also rejected Lopez's claim of overbreadth as applied because Lopez 
"persisted in making untoward contact with [the juvenile victim] after he knew that [she] 
and her parents did not want him to contact her." Id. He persisted even after being 
contacted by a private attorney and after the issuance of a no-contact order. Id. 
Therefore, Lopez "was not prosecuted for merely being in [the victim's] presence; he 
was prosecuted for causing emotional distress" and engaging in behavior directed at her 
that could reasonably be understood as threatening." Id. 
Vagueness. Having rejected Lopez's claims of overbreadth, the Court similarly 
disposed of his claim of vagueness. Id. The Court reiterated that "emotional distress" is 
well defined in Utah; therefore, "the definition's absence" from the stalking statute "does 
not render the statute unconstitutionally vague." Id. Moreover, a defendant's 
"knowledge" that his conduct threatened or distressed the victim is an element of the 
crime of stalking. Id. (citing section 76-5-106.5(2)(a)). Accordingly, the stalking statute 
could not "mislead a person of common intelligence into misunderstanding what is 
prohibited." Id. (quoting State v. Cuomo, 642 A.2d 90, 98 (Conn. Supp. 1993)). 
The Court pointed out that unlike an overbreadth analysis, a vagueness analysis 
begins with an examination of the defendant's conduct "before analyzing hypothetical 
applications of the law." Id. at 1265 (quoting Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 
P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-495 (1982))). Because Lopez knew his victim "did not 
want contact with him," and because he persisted in that contact even after being ordered 
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to cease, he could not claim the stalking statute was vague as applied to him, "let alone 
that the statute was totally invalid and incapable of any valid application." Id. 
Recognizing that this Court rejected Lopez's claims that the stalking statute was 
overbroad and vague, both facially and as applied to Lopez, Aplt. Br. at 27, defendant 
attempts to distinguish Lopez on the ground that Lopez "did not address a situation . . . 
where [a] legitimate, protected, First Amendment right was at issue[.] . . . Lopez did not 
involve an individual exercising his right to picket a business or frequent particular 
businesses in an area where he may not be wanted." Aplt. Br. at 24-25. In other words, 
defendant claims that while the statute was not overbroad and vague as applied to Lopez, 
it is overbroad and vague as applied to him. Aplt. Br. at 27. 
Contrary to defendant's blanket assertion, and as demonstrated above, Lopez did 
in fact involve similar claims that the stalking statute infringes first amendment 
freedoms, albeit association and movement. Defendant's conclusory observation 
provides no legally significant reason to distinguish the result in Lopez from this case. 
Both Lopez and defendant conducted their stalking in public places and their conduct 
falls within the purview of the stalking statute, not because they were innocently 
exercising their first amendment freedoms, but because their threatening conduct was 
"directed at" causing "emotional distress to an intended person." Lopez, 935 P.2d 1263-
64. Thus, the stalking statute was not overbroad as applied to either Lopez or defendant. 
Moreover, defendant's cursory analysis fails to acknowledge the specific intent 
requirement of the stalking statute, let alone this Court's determination that that 
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requirement "vitiates" any claim that the statute "could mislead a person of common 
intelligence into misunderstanding what is prohibited." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 
(quotation omitted). Thus, because defendant has not and cannot show that the statute is 
vague as applied to him, there is no need to consider whether it is vague on its face. Id. 
In sum, defendant's overbreadth and vagueness challenges fail because he cannot 
demonstrate, on this record, that the instant charge encompassed any constitutionally 
protected conduct. Moreover, he cannot meaningfully distinguish Lopez. Defendant 
thus fails to demonstrate that the stalking statute is overbroad, either facially or as 
applied, or that it is so vague he could not understand that his threatening conduct was 
prohibited. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, defendant's claims of insufficiency, jury instruction error, 
and constitutional deficiency should be rejected and his jury conviction for stalking 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 3 _ July 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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par<mg -it with the most menacing of the weapons tr.at ne r.~s. 
The rest of them are handguns. There's one other rifle. He 
picks the shotgun to be in her parking lot with for no good 
reason. That's what the jury needs to hear. Was that gun used 
to menace and threaten her? Was that gun used to escalate the 
stalking? That's exactly the purpose for that and that's what 
the jury needs to hear about and that's what the jury needs to 
decide. The jury may decide it doesn't rise to the level, but 
that should be the jury's decision and for this Court to say, 
no reasonable jury can prove that/ I think is beyond that. 
That's the evidence that's in and that's the evidence the Court 
needs to look at. 
THE COURT: Any reply? 
MR. RICHARDS: I'd submit it, Judge. 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny that motion as well for 
the following reasons; this particular crime is characterized 
as being a constellation of events, by its very definition that 
it's a course of conduct. I think for me to interpret the 
statute to require that a weapon be used at two or more times 
in order for it to rise to the level of a second degree felony 
would be outside the common sense nature of the crime itself 
because it's a constellation of conduct and I think it's not 
just one thing, it's many things and that's exactly what it's 
described as in order for it to be, in fact, a stalking 
violation. 
1 As far as the victim never seeing the gun, I 
2 recognize that this case distinguishes itself from the case the 
3 State is relying on in the interest of RGB, 597 Pacific Second 
4 1333, in that this was a direct contact with the victim. The 
5 gun was, although not pointed, shot, brandished in any way, it 
6 was in this person's front pants with the handle exposed 
7 ; therefore making it clear that it was available for use. 
8 l This is one step removed in the sense that it deals 
9 with the situation or that she's not directly in view of it, 
10 , but it's not an unreasonable step to also assume that since it 
11 was her place of business where she ordinarily was, her car was 
12 in the parking lot, that she was there and would find out about 
13 j it because there were employees that obviously saw it and we 
14 ! can assume Mr. Weisberg may have known that. At least it's 
15 J certainly subject to argument. 
I 
16 ! Course of conduct implies threats implied by conduct 
17 I and that's included under the course of conduct definition. It 
18 : doesn't specifically say the person has to be in direct line 
19 < with the weapon. It doesn't have to say they have to view it. 
20 j This is a different kind of a case, right, and I think will 
21 i hinge mainly on arguments of counsel frankly, unlike a lot of 
22 cases where it's just simply a matter of determining what 
23 actually happened. It's clear what happened here, the question 
24 ! is intentional knowing, those types of things. I'm going to 
2 5 i deny the motion. 
And I'm specifically going to put cms on the re:::: 
because in case there is a review of this, I'm specifically 
relying on the guidance from the Utah Supreme Court in making 
my decision in the case of in re; the interest of RGB, 597 
Pacific Second 1333 where it was the only case that I'm aware 
of where it specifically addressed the issue of use of a 
firearm. 
Frankly, I've seen it referred to actual use of a 
firearm, use of a firearm and frankly it's not real, there's no 
definition in the statute of what use of a firearm is, but this 
case I think makes clear in the statement, if merely exhibiting 
the gun creates fear in the victim, it constitutes use of a 
firearm for that purpose. I'm relying on that statement in 
making my decision. I just want them to know that so they can 
give me credit at least for relying on president. That's what 
I'm relying on in terms of allowing it to go forward. 
Obviously, the facts are fairly clear. The gun was 
not pointed. That's undisputed. The gun was not pointed. It 
was not used in any fashion other than exposed for a period of 
time, not in what could be, I guess, argued as a threatening 
manner, but it was exposed just as having a gun in your belt 
probably could be argued as not a threatening manner similar to 
this case, it was found to have been in use. That's the best I 
can do. 
MR. RICHARDS: All right. Judge, I would like to 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
ANDREW WEISBERG, 
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STIPULATED SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE RECORD 
CASE NO. 991905379 
JUDGE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Remand from the 
Utah Court of Appeals, the State, represented by Camille L. Neider, and Defendant, represented 
by Ronald J. Yengich, stipulate to the following supplement to the record: 
1. On October 25, 2000, Dennis Porter testified to the following: 
Mr. Porter works for Sun Valley Mortgage. Through his work he was acquainted with 
the Defendant and Robin Archibald. On April 6, 2000, Mr. Porter was having lunch at Winger's 
Restaurant on Harrison Blvd. with co-workers Rich Pliippen and Brook Domingaez. Mr. Porter 
initially saw through the window of the restaurant, that Defendant was in the parking lot. Mr. 
Porter saw him drive by the front of the restaurant 2 or 3 times. Mr. Porter and his party had 
been served their food and were eating. Mr. Porter saw Ms. Archibald seated a couple of booths 
away with one of the employees from her office. Ms. Archibald had her back to Mr. Porter's 
table After Mr Porter saw Defendant in the parking lot, Defendant abruptly came and sat at Mr 
Porter's table. Mr Porter's party had no plans to meet Defendant at the restaurant, nor had they 
invited Defendant to sit with them. Mr Porter observed that Defendant was acting very unusual, 
that Defendant was much more agitated that he had ever seen him before. Defendant immediately 
started talking about Ms. Archibald in a very loud voice. Defendant stated that he recognized Ms 
Archibald's car and that he believed he had bought it. Defendant made several statements about 
what he would like to see happen to Ms. Archibald. Defendant stated, T d like to hire some 
black me to brutally rape her," and then stated, "No, she'd probably enjoy it." Defendant also 
stated that "If she were alone, I'd run her over with my truck and then I would back over her to 
make sure the job was done " After making those statements, the waiter approached the table and 
asked Defendant if he would like to order anything. Defendant stated loudly that he "would like 
her severed head on a fucking platter" and gestured toward Ms. Archibald. After making these 
statements, Defendant abruptly left the table and walked out of the restaurant. Mr. Porter 
immediately went over to Ms. Archibald's table and informed her of Defendant's statements. 
2. The State and Defendant stipulated that, if called, Brook Dominguez and Rich Phippen 
would testify to the same events that Mr. Porter testified to. 
3 On October 25, 2000, Jennifer Williams testified to the following: 
Ms Williams was employed by Avis & Archibald Title Company from May 1998 to 
December 1999 as a receptionist at the front desk. Ms. Williams first saw Defendant picketing 
outside of the office 3 to 4 months after she started working there. After that, Ms. Williams saw 
Defendant "all of the time" in the parking lot or on the street below the business. Ms. Williams 
would keep track of the times that Defendant came to the parking lot or was nearby the business 
She said that sometimes it was everyday, at other times it was every other day When Defendant 
was in the parking lot he would do different things Sometimes Defendant would park by Ms. 
Archibald's car and just sit there. Other times he would go into the dry cleaners empty handed 
and come out empty handed. Defendant would also drive slowly in from of the business and just 
stare into the office. Defendant was also in the parking lot on a number of those occasions, 
picketing the company. December 23, 1999, was Ms. Williams' last day at Avis & Archibald. 
Ms. Williams and some other employees were outside the office having a cigarette break when 
Defendant pulled up in his car. Defendant parked next to Ms. Archibald's car and went into the 
dry cleaners empty handed and came out empty handed. Ms. Williams was closest to Defendant's 
car, although she was faced away from him. Ms. Williams saw that the others she was with began 
to act strangely in response to something behind her and everyone hurried into the business. Ms. 
Williams followed the others inside where they told her that Defendant had a gun. Ms. Williams 
did not see the gun because her back was to Defendant. Ms. Williams was scared of Defendant 
because of the things he would do. She was terrified that he came to the parking lot so often. 
Ms. Williams also stated that while working at the front desk she received many hang-up phone 
calls. 
Dated this 1* day of February, 2001. 
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THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to deny yc^r -c:::r. ::. 
the constitutionality issue. I think the statute does set 
forth specific and actually very clear conduct that is 
required. It also sets forth a Mansura that is intentional or 
knowingly and it also puts it in the standard or what a 
reasonable person would perceive and I think all those are 
facts specific to any given case. I would agree with you. I 
think this is a somewhat unusual case and it's certainly 
subject to a great deal of advocacy, I think, and argument to 
the jury and certainly has a lot of factual issues, I think, 
that need to be resolved by the jury and I think we can 
instruct clearly to the point where on the statute you have 
many arguments that you can make. 
MR. RICHARDS: My second motion then, I would move to 
dismiss the second degree element of the stalking charge. In 
other words, kick it down to the misdemeanor charge and I make 
that motion on two grounds. First, I have read the State in 
the interest of RGB and this is a totally different case. In 
RGB, number one, it's an aggravated robbery versus a stalking 
case, but putting that aside, what happens in RGB is that this 
fellow goes into the court, he's a juvenile - court, I've got 
court on my mind - he goes into a store and he has a gun in his 
belt. Now, it says tucked in the front of his jeans and the 
wording they use is that he goes into the shop, asks for all 
the shop's money in a white paper bag, while revealing a gun 
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1 call it a Motion to Arrest Judgment, I think is improper and 
2 the State would ask that you dismiss that or deny the motion. 
3 THE COURT: Anything else? 
4 MR- RICHARDS: This is addressing the Motion to 
5 Arrest Judgment, I think it is proper. You read the statute, 
6 you're allowed to make a motion to arrest judgment and that's 
7 exactly what we've done. You can do it either under 
8 constitutional reasons, factual reasons or any other reasons 
9 J the Court deems appropriate and I think this is an appropriate 
10 deal and would ask that you dismiss. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I have read both memorandum and 
12 I'm going to deny the motion. It's preserved for the purposes 
13 of appeal. I don't think the issue of the constitutionality of 
14 the statute has been thoroughly addressed up to this point by a 
15 Court of Appeals, I don't see that this deviates in any 
16 significant way to cause me to review that statute and 
17 basically overturn the Court of Appeals on it. It's denied. 
18 This is the day set for sentencing and I have the 
19 report in front of me. I might note that I don't know if 
20 you've seen some of the letters that have come in, but there 
21 have been letters on Mr. Weisberg's behalf by a number of 
22 people pointing out areas of his character that they wanted me 
23 to know. I don't if there are any of these people in the 
24 audience today. I've read the letters and I'd welcome counsel 
25 to take a look at them if you'd like to see them. I haven't 
i 
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Addendum D 
76-5-106.5. Definitions - Stalking - Injunction - Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a 
person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or a 
combination thereof directed at or toward a person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person who 
regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household within the prior six 
months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person 
that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer emotional 
distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his immediate family. 
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking 
injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or intentionally or 
knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section. 
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or 
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, 
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Stalking Injunctions. 
(5) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially similar to the 
offense of stalking; 
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in another 
jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the victim of the stalking or 
a member of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the previous felony offense; or 
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection (7). 
(6) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the crime of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses 
that ar substantially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under Subsection 
(5); or 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of crimes 
in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which 
the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony offenses. 
(7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for a 
period of time shall operate as an application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction 
limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim. 
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued without a hearing unless the 
defendant requests a hearing at the time of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and 
mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance. The court shall give the 
defendant notice of his right to request a hearing. 
(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be held at the time of the verdict, finding, or 
plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance unless 
the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause. 
(ii) If the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or 
acceptance of plea in abeyance was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the judgment 
and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in abeyance must be filed 
3 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the LexisNexis Group. AH rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
by the victim in the district court as an application and request for hearing for a permanent 
criminal stalking injunction. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief: 
(i) an order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place 
of employment of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim and 
members of the victim's immediate family or household and to stay away from any specified 
place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victim; and 
(ii) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with the victim, including an 
order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any communication 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm, including personal, written, or telephone contact with the 
victim, the victim's employers, employees, fellow workers, or others with whom communication 
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim. 
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved upon application of the victim 
to the court which granted the order. 
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section shall be 
sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system. 
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section shall be effective 
statewide. 
(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section shall constitute an offense of 
stalking. Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a criminal 
action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both. 
(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the filing of a criminal information for stalking 
based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking injunction issued 
pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
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76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of 
such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable 
of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or 
unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over 
tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, 
that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic storage 
or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing information in a form 
capable of being preserved. 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a membeT of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement 
